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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
SUGARHOUSE FINANCE COMPA-
NY, A Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs. -
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, A 
Corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent, 
and 
-w ALICER BANK & TRUST COMP A-
NY, A Corporation, 
Defendant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
11029 
This is an action to recover funds disbursed on 
checks drawn on appellant's account with defendant, 
Walker Bank & Trust Company, after having been pre-
sented to and honored by respondent bank. The endorse-
ments on the checks may have been forged by one Guy 
E. Davis, an employee of appellant, and in some cases 
the checks bore no endorsement whatsoever. Other checks 
were made directly to Zions First National Bank as payee 
and the proceeds from all of the checks negotiated with 
Zions First National Bank are believed to have been 
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deposited to the personal account of the said Guy E. 
Davis. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On the 12th day of January, 1967, an Order of Dis-
missal without prejudice was entered in favor of respond-
ent, Zions First National Bank, and against appellant. 
Appellant then filed a Pebtion for Intermediate Appeal 
which Petition was denied. On the 6th day of February, 
1967, appellant filed a new Complaint against respond-
ent, Zions First National Bank, and against defendant, 
Walker Bank & Trust Company. On the 30th day of 
August, 1967, an Order of Dismissal with prejudice was 
entered in favor of respondent and against appellant. 
From this Order and ]j-,inal Judgment this appeal is 
prosecuted. 
R~LIE.F' SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment of the 
Lower Court, remanding the case back to the Lower 
Court for a trial on the issues of fact in dispute in this 
matter. 
STA'rEMENT OF FACTS 
During the lH'riod lwginning September 11, 1964, 
and t•nding .Tnl)' 2(i, 19\iS, tliirty-fiv(~ checks were drawn 
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against appellant's checking account at defendant, 
Walker Bank & Trust Company's Sugar house Branch. 
During one sixty day period beginning April 1, 1965 and 
ending May 30, 1965, twelve checks totalling $90,000.00 
were honored by respondent bank and the proceeds 
therefrom deposited to accounts of Guy E. Davis. The 
checks were signed by Guy E. Davis, the then manager 
of appellant, Sugarhouse Finance Company, and co-
signed by one other person authorized to sign checks 
on the chcck;ng account of appellant. Thirty-two of the 
checks w<e~re made pa~·able to yarious payees and the 
endorsement in each case was a signature other than the 
named payee. In some cases no endorsement whatsoever 
appears on the checks thus negotiated. The endorse-
ments were made either by Davis, by someone acting in 
his behalf, or perhaps by a stranger to the whole trans-
action. Upon presenting the checks to respondent bank 
for payment, the checks were honored by tellers of 
n•spondent bank without any effort having been made 
to discover whether or not the endorsements were genu-
ine and indeed in some cases without requiring any en-
dorsement whatsoever. The amount of each check so 
presented was then credited to an account or accounts 
belonging to Guy E. Davis. The checks ranged in amount 
from $2,300.00 to $5,550.00 and the total amount of all 
checks thus honored being the sum of $150,265.00. 
Three of the checks honored by Zions First National 
Bank were payable directly to Zions First National Bank 
as named payee. These three checks totalling $47,000.00 
were negotiated during a six day period from May 21, 
to May 27, 1965, and the proceeds therefrom credited 
to the account or accounts belonging to Guy E. Davis. 
Although attempts have been made to recover the sums 
involved, the attempts have met with little success. 
The Lower Court dismissed without prejudice the 
original Complaint of the plaintiff on the ground that 
it failed to state a claim against defendant, Zions First 
National Bank, upon which relief can be granted and 
on the ground that the allegations of said Complaint are 
insufficient as a matter of law to state a claim against 
defendant, Zions First National Bank, by reason of 
Title 22, Chapter 1, Utah Code Annotated (1953). Plain-
tiff's Amended Complaint was dismissed with prejudice 
on the ground that plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a 
claim against defendant, Zions First National Bank, upon 
which relief can be granted. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE 
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT FILED HEREIN FOR THE REA-
SON THAT THE PROVISIONS OF TITLE 22, CHAPTER 1, 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953), ARE INAPPLICABLE 
TO THE INSTANT PROCEEDINGS IN THAT THE EM-
PLOYEE OF THE APPELLANT WAS NOT A FIDUCIARY 
WITHIN THE l\IEANING OF THAT TERM AS USED IN 
SAID ACT. 
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The term "fiduciary" as used in Title 22, Chapter 1, 
Utah Code Annotated, (1953) is not identical with the 
meaning of that term as it is used generally, wherein 
an agent is said to be in a fiduciary relationship with his 
principal. It is stated by authorities on Agency that the 
fiduciary capacity of an agent imposes upon an agent 
a duty of loyalty of his principal. An agent must exer-
cise his powers in accordance ·with that duty and do so 
only for the benefit of his principal. It is submitted 
that the fiduciary relationship required by the Fiduci-
aries Act is somehting more than a mere agency rela-
tionship and the fiduciary responsibilities of an agent 
associated with such a relationship. Such a distinction 
has been recognized by this Court as well as others. In 
Tatsuno v. Kasai, 70 Utah 203, 259 P. 318 (1927), this 
Court stated: 
"That there was here a fiduciary relation, one 
not only as generally exists between a mere prin-
cipal and agent, but that of a trustee and cestui 
que trust, is clearly shown in the record." 
See also, In re Arbuckle's Estate, 220 P. 2d 950, 955 (Cal. 
1950). 
Although there are few cases in which the Courts 
have attempted to define "fiduciary" as it is used in 
the Fiduciaries Act, there are cases in which some dis-
tinction has been attempted to be drawn. In Harlan E. 
111 oore & Co. v. Champaign National Bank, 141 N.E. 2d 
97 (Ill. App. 1957), the plaintiff in count II of its Com-
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plaint had alleged the language of Section 8 of the Fi-
duciaries Act (our Section 22-1-8) for its contention 
that by showing bad faith on the part of the defendant 
bank, the bank would be liable for certain acts of an 
agent of the plaintiff. rrhe appeal court affirmed a di-
rected verdict in favor of defendant on the ground that: 
"There vrns a failure of proof that -Wilkie as an 
agent of plaintiff, was a fiduciary within the 
meaning of Section 1, Fiduciaries Obligations Act . 
. . . " Id. at 103. 
The agent Wilkie had basically the same duties and 
position that Guy E. Davis held with appellant in the 
instant case. The clear interpretation of the holding of 
the above quoted words is that there must be some 
proof of fiduciary capacity in the typical sense of trustee, 
before a corporate agent can be held to be within the 
Act. It is interesting to note that some states have 
enacted laws much more stringent than the Fiduciaries 
Act for the purpose of protecting banks from liability. 
In General Casualty Co. of America v. Seattle First Na-
tional Bank, 256 P.2d 287 (Wash. 1953), the Court had be-
fore it a statute designed to relax some of the common 
law rules under which banks were formerly held liable for 
certain transactions. This statute contains the following 
language: 
"Where a elwck or other negotiabh, instrument 
is drawn, made or endors('d in the name of or for 
a corporation, finn, association, Pstate or person 
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hereinafter called the principal, by an officer, 
trustee, attorney, or other agent or fiduciary, 
hereinafter called agent ... neither the fact that 
such check or other negotiable instrument is so 
drawn or endorsed, or is paid by the drawee, or 
is deposited in the general account of such agent 
or is given by him or its proceeds used in payment 
of his private debt to the bank in which deposited 
or to any other person or is negotiated by him in 
any personal transaction, shall singly, or collec-
tively be sufficient to put the depository or drawee 
bank or any other person, bank, firm, or corpor-
ation, upon inquiry as to the authority of such 
agent or constitute notice of an infirmity in the 
check or other negotiable instrument or defect 
in the title of the agent, in the absence of actual 
knowledge upon the part of such bank or person 
that such check or other negotiable instrument 
was drawn, endorsed, negotiated, deposited or 
paid without the authority of the principal." 
R.C.W. 62.01.0195. (Emphasis added.) 
The Washington Supreme Court in construing this 
statute stated: 
"This statute goes even further than the Uniform 
Fiduciaries Act, 9A Uniform Laws Annotated, 
19, Section 5, in relaxing the common law rule for 
the purpose of protecting banks from liability." 
It can be clearly sec>n that this statute is more stringent 
in the protection it affords hanks than the Uniform Fi-
ducaries Act in two ways: ( 1) The statute provides that 
either an agent on fiduciary may deal with funds of the 
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principal without the depository or drawee bank having 
the duty to inquire into the authority by which such funds 
are dealt. (2) This statute excepts from its application 
only cases in which the bank has "actual knowledge" 
the check was drawn, etc. without authority. The Uni-
form Fiduciaries Act, however, also excepts cases in 
which there is knowledge of facts "\vhich indicate that the 
bank's action in taking the instrument "amounts to bad 
faith." Had the Utah State Legislature intended to in-
dude all ag0nts within the rPalm of the Fiduciaries Act 
it could have done so in the manner in which it was done 
in the above quoted statute by the Washington State 
Legislature. However, the obvious intent of the legis-
lature was that the Fiduciaries Act should apply only to 
a person holding funds in a true fiduciary capacity -
that is, funds held in the sense of a typical trust for 
payment out by the trustee or fiduciary for certain speci-
fied purposes. Whether or not Guy E. Davis held such 
a relationship with appellant in this case is a question 
of fact which should be left for jury determination. In-
deed, the only evidence of the relationship of Guy E. 
Davis to appellant in the record of this case is an Affi-
davit of the vice-president of Zions First National Bank 
stating that based upon records in his custody he believed 
that Gu~· E. Davis vvas the manager of Sngarhouse Fi-
nance Company during tlw times pertinent to this liti-
gation. rrh<'rn is no evidenCP stating or SPtting forth 
the duties and autlwri t:-· of (J uy K Davis in his position 
of manager of ~)ngarl1ot<s<> Finan('t~ Company. 
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It is therefore submitted that Guy E. Davis was not 
a fiduciary within the meaning of the Utah Fiduciaries 
Act. It is further urged that the question of whether 
he had the fiduciary relationship necessary to bring his 
transactions within the Act is a question of fact which 
could not be decided by a Judge on a Motion of Dismissal. 
POINT II 
THE FAIL URE OF THE BANK TO REQUIRE THE PER-
SON AL ENDORSEl\IENT OF GUY E. DA VIS ON ALL THE 
CHECKS NEGOTIATED WITH ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL 
BANK WAS A BREACH OF THE CUSTOM AND PRACTICES 
OF BANKING INSTITUTIONS AND AS SUCH CONSTI-
TUTED NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE BANK. 
'rhere is some dispute as to whether or not the 
checks negotiated by Guy E. Davis with Zions First 
National Bank were in fact forged instruments or fic-
titious payee checks. Plaintiff's original Complaint al-
leges that the checks were forgeries. Final determina-
tion of whether the checks were forgeries or fictitious 
payee checks is a question of fact which must ultimately 
be decided by a jury. However, for the purpose of estab-
lishing the negligence of Zions First National Bank it 
is immaterial whether or not the checks are found to be 
fictitious payee checks or forged instrumens. The bank 
violated a duty established by custom and usage of re-
quiring the personal endorsement of the person negoti-
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ating a check. This practice is believed followed uni-
formly by banking institutions whether the check pre-
sented be bearer paper or a check endorsed over to a 
third party. Thus, while technically a bearer instrument 
requires no endorsement for negotiation, the custom and 
usage of banks has modified this rule. The reason for 
the rule is self-evident. The endorsement on a bearer 
instrument gives the hank negotiating the check, the 
drawee bank, and the depositor a record of the person 
rPceiving the proceeds therefrom. 
In the instant case, if the bank had required the per-
sonal endorsement of Davis on all of the checks he nego-
tiated, appellant could have discovered that the proceeds 
of the checks were actually going to Davis rather than 
the named payees and might easily have uncovered the 
plot at a point where much of the misappropriated funds 
might have been recovered. 
Custom and usage plays an important part in the 
development of Commercial Law. Indeed, the new Uni-
form Commercial Code expressly provides: 
" ( 1) This act shall be liberally construed and a p-
p lied to promote its underlying purposes and poli-
cies. 
(2) Underlying purposes and policies of this act 
are ... 
(b) to lWrmit the continued expansion of 
commercial practices through custom, usage and 
agreement of the parties." Utah Code Annotated, 
St•ction 70A-l-l02 (1953). 
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While admittedly the Uniform Commercial Code has no 
direct bearing on the instant case the above quoted sec-
tion demonstrates the importance of custom and usage 
to the development of Commercial Law. 
Especially has cusom and usage been important in 
the development of banking law. It is stated at 10 Am 
J1tr 2d, Section 6 (1963) that: 
"Usages and customs have played an important 
role in developing the law of banking. Indeed, 
much of the law of banking has grown out of 
custom, and, notwithstanding the extent to which 
the law has been embodied in statutes, there is 
a large part of it which still remains unwritten." 
Many courts have held admissible evidence of bank-
ing custom and usage for the purpose of indicating to 
the jury the ordinary practice of others, in order to form-
ulate a standard of reasonable care, although the custom 
in and of itself does not necessarily establish the stand-
ard. Thus, it was held in Martin v. First National Bank, 
219 SW 2d 312, 8 ALR 2d 435 (Missouri 1949) that evi-
dence of the customs of banks in the vicinity to accept 
an instruction as to the issuance of cashier's checks from 
one who had been to the bank on previous occasions on 
behalf of the same depositor transacting the depositor's 
business with the bank, is admissible on the issue of the 
bank's negligence in issuing to one who handled the 
depositor's account, in exchange for checks on itself, 
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cashier's checks which were then wrongfully converted. 
Furthermore, it has been held that the court may take 
judicial notice of certain banking customs. It is gener-
ally recognized that in order for a court to take judicial 
notice of a matter there are three material requisites: 
1. The matter of which the court will take ju-
dicial notice must be one of common and general 
knowledge, although such knowledge need not be 
nniversal; 
2. The matter must be known; that is, well es-
tablished and not donhtful or uncertain; and 
3. The matter must be known within the limits 
of the jurisdiction of the court. 89 ALR 1336. 
Following these rules it has been held that a court will 
take judicial notice of the fact that, when a customer of 
a bank deposits with it for collection a check drawn on 
an institution in another city or state, it is not anticipated 
either by the customer or by the receiving bank that the 
collecting bank will send one of its own officers or serv-
ants out of town to present the check to the drawee for 
payment. The court held the defendant bank negligent 
in forwarding of the check in question directly to the 
drawee bank which was located in another town when 
there was another bank in the same town. The court 
took judicial notice that such a procedure was not custom-
ary among hanks. City of Douglas v. First National 
Bank, 239 P. 785 (Arizona 192G). rt is tlterdore herein 
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submitted that the custom and usage of banks in this 
vicinity is to require the endorsement of the person pre-
senting a check for payment whether said check be a 
bearer instrument or otherwise. The violation of a cus-
tom and usage of such wide spread occurence and uniform 
application certainly goes to the question of negligence 
on the part of the collecting bank. Indeed, the practice 
is so prevalent and known in this jurisdiction that judi-
cial notice of such a practice is proper. 
POINT III 
THE CHECKS NEGOTIATED BY DAVIS MUST BE 
CONSIDERED TO BE FORGED INSTRUMENTS RATHER 
THAN FICTITIOUS PA YEE CHECKS. THEREFORE, THE 
PROVISIONS OF TITLE 22, CHAPTER 1, UTAH CODE AN-
NOTATED (1953) ARE INAPPLICABLE, FOR THE REA-
SO THAT SAID ACT WAS NOT INTENDED TO RELIEVE 
THE BANK OF THE RESPONSIBILITY OF ASCERTAIN-
ING THE GENUINENESS OF ENDORSEMENT ON CHECKS. 
Plaintiff's original Complaint alleges that the thirty-
two checks of which a list is contained in Exhibit "A" 
of plaintiff's original Complaint, contain forged endorse-
ments. Since there has been no Answer filed by the 
defendants in this action and no other evidence intro-
duced to contradict this allegation, at this point in the 
litigation it must be deemed that the endorsements on 
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said checks were indeed forgeries. However, there are 
other compelling reasons for believing that said endorse-
ments are indeed forgeries and that the checks are thus 
forged instruments rather than fictitious payee checks. 
While it is readily admitted that Guy E. Davis did 
have authority to draw checks on the deposits of Sugar-
house Finance Company it was required that such checks 
have a second signature before they were valid. All of 
the checks negotiated by Guy E. Davis with Zions First 
National Bank did in fact bear one other signature than 
that of Guy E. Davis. The question of whether a check 
is a forged instrument or fictitious payee check is deter-
mined by the intent of the person making it so payable. 
Utah Code Annotated, §44-1-10 (3) (1953). There is no 
evidence on record as to the intent of Davis or the 
second person signing the thirty-two checks negotiated 
with Zions First National Bank. In a similar case in 
which it was required that two signatures be upon the 
check before it was negotiable, the Court stated the fol-
lowing: 
"In our opinion, the difficulty in the instant case 
is, in view of the facts, created by the theoretical 
significance attached to the second signature. We 
do not question the proposition that the intention 
·with which the check is drawn is all important to 
a decision as to whether or not it was drawn to a 
fictitious payee. V\T e reassert said principle. 
There is, however, no more reason to say that 
the intent must be that of a co-signer than to say 
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it must be that of the actual maker, to-wit: the 
corporation. The controlling intent is that of the 
person who within the scope of his authority does 
the final thing which gives vitality to the check 
or who places it in circulation." Goodyear Tire & 
Rubber Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust 
Co., 1 Cal. App. 2d 694, 37 P.2d 483 (1934). 
It is true that in that case the controlling intent was 
found to be that of the defrauding employee for the 
reason that the second person signing the check was held 
to be a mere automaton who had no real intent that 
could be attributed to the corporation. In the instant 
case there is no evidence whatsoever that the second per-
son signing the checks was a party to the fraud or that 
said person had any other intent than that the proceeds 
of the checks should go to named payees. There is evi-
dence that the second person signing the check did in 
fact know personally many of the named payees in said 
checks and that said person intended fully that the 
named payees should receive the proceeds therefrom. 
Viewed in this light the thirty-two checks must be con-
sidered to contain forged endorsements and are not 
bearer paper within the meaning of Fictitious Payee 
Doctrine. Certainly, the determination of the intent of 
both Guy E. Davis and the second person signing said 
checks is a question of fact that may not be decided by 
a Judge considering only the question of whether a 
Complaint states a valid claim. 
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A second reason supporting the allegation that the 
endorsements on the checks were forgeries involves the 
definition of a fictitious payee check and the effect of 
the Fictitious Payee Doctrine upon the duty of a bank 
to ascertain the genuineness of endorsements and the 
right of the person presenting the check to receive pay-
ment therefor. Assuming that the checks in question 
were in fact fictitious payee instruments, does the bank 
have no duty to ascertain the genuineness of endorse-
ments on an instrument when the bank has no knowledge 
that the check is a fictitious payee check at the time of 
negotiating said check~ In other words, the question 
that must be decided is whether or not the bank has the 
duty to ascertain the genuineness of endorsements or to 
require an endorsement on a check which it does not 
know to be a fictitious payee check at the time of nego-
tiation. Certainly an intermediary bank which received 
a check on a forged endorsement and collects it from 
the drawee bank is liable to the drawer of the check for 
his loss. 10 Arn. Jur. 2d §G29. The logical interpretation 
of the Fictitious Payee Doctrine would require that the 
bank be aware that the check is a fictitious payee check 
at the time of negotiation. If the bank does not know 
that the check is a fictitious payee check at the time of 
negotiation the bank is still held to the duy to inquire 
as to the genninPness of endorsements on said check, the 
same as it wonlJ if the check were a check with a real 
named payee. 
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Furthermore, when the bank in the regular course 
of business stamps upon the check its guarantee of 
prior endorsements and transmits the check to the drawee 
hank for collection it is a ridiculous result to believe 
that the bank is guaranteeing the endorsement of a fic-
titious person. While there is no contract relationship 
between a depositor and an intermediary bank accept-
ing a check for negotiation, the depositor is the third 
party beneficiary of the intermediary bank's guarantee 
of prior endorsements to the drawee bank. Therefore, 
if the bank stamps upon a check its guarantee of prior 
endorsements the fact that the check is a fictitious payee 
check has no bearing upon the rights of the depositor 
to hold liable the intermediary bank for acts in making 
payment on said check. The intermediary bank by stamp-
ing its guarantee of prior endorsements is estopped from 
at a later point alleging that the check is a fictitious 
payee check. 
For these reasons it can be seen that a bank does 
have the duty to ascertain the genuineness of endorse-
ments at the time of negotiation and further to ascertain 
whether or not a check is a fictitious payee check and 
thus bearer paper at that time. If the bank pays the 
check and transmits it with its guarantee of prior en-
dorsements the check's endorsement must then be 
held to havl:' bePn a forged endorsement. See Standard 
Acc. Ins. Co. v. Pfllecchia, 15 N.J. 162, 104 A.2d 288 
(1954). 
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It is therefore submitted that the checks were in 
fact checks containing forged endorsements ratht>r than 
fictitious payt>e checks, and that the provisions of the 
Utah Fiduciaries Act do not apply to a transaction in 
which such a forged instrument is involved. In the 
Commissioner's prefatory note to the Uniform Fiduciary 
Act, 9B Uniform Laws Annotated (1966), at page 22~ 
it is said: 
''The general pnrpost> of the Act is to facilitate 
the performance by fiduciaries of their obliga-
tions, rather than to favor any particular class 
of persons dealing with fiduciaries." 
In order to facilitate that purpose, it was necessary to 
relieve a bank from the duty of inquiring into the au-
thority of a fiduciary to draw a check, to transfer a 
check, or to deposit a check. For example, if the checks 
in this case had been made payable to cash, Guy E. 
Davis keeping the cash proceeds, the bank probably 
"\rnuld not be liable. Also, if the checks were made pay-
able to John Doe who cashed them and gave the money 
to Davis, thf~ bank probably would not be liable. Even 
assuming that Guy E. Davis vvas a fiduciary within the 
meaning of the Act, which is not admitted, where a 
fiduciary check is rt>gular on its face a bank would not 
necessaril~· lw liahlP for an:-· breach of duty by the fidu-
ciary. But in this east-, it is allPgt>d that tlw checks 
were not regular on tlwir face; that the.v do bt>ar forged 
endorsPmPnts. Pnd,,r tliP Fiduciaries Act, a bank may 
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be relieved from any duty of inquiring into the extent 
of the authority of a named fiduciary, but all of the 
other duties of the bank towards its depositors remain 
intact, including, the duty of determining the genuineness 
of endorsements. Nothing in the Act purports to relieve 
any bank from that duty. It is therefore submitted that 
the payment of the checks was made on forged endorse-
ments and that the provisions of the Utah Fiduciaries 
Act are not applicable. 
POINT IV 
EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE PROVISIONS OF TITLE 
22, CHAPTER 1, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953) ARE 
APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT PROCEEDINGS, THE 
LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S 
AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR THE REASON THAT THE 
QUESTION OF WHETHER RESPONDENT BANK ACTED 
IN BAD FAITH IS A QUESTION OF FACT PROPERLY 
THE SUBJECT OF JURY DETERMINATION. 
Even assuming that either by operation of law or 
through a fact determination Guy E. Davis was found 
to have had the requisite relationship with Sugarhouse 
Finance Company to bring him within the requirements 
of the Utah Fiduciaries Act, the question of whether 
or not bad faith was shown the part of the bank is one 
not properly the subject of a motion for dismissal. The 
qlwstion of bad faith is om• which should be determined 
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h~- the triers of fact rather than a judge considering 
only whether or not a Complaint states a valid claim. 
There is sufficient evidence pointing to the fact that 
the respondent bank did act in bad faith to give the 
jury ample evidence to consider that question. 
In discussing the requisites necessary for a show-
ing of bad faith one court defined "bad faith" as knowl-
edge by a responsible agency, officer, or employee of 
the bank of an incriminating state of facts, short of 
actual knowledge of the breach of trust, but conscious 
of it, and aiding and abetting or acquiescing, in the 
breach. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. National New-
ark & East Building Co., 175 A. 609 (N.J. 1934). Fur-
thermore, it was held in another case that circumstances 
showing a transfer not in the ordinary course of business 
were sufficient to show bad faith in the meaning of ~() 
of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act. Norristown-Penn. Trust 
Co. v. Middleton, 150 A. 885 (Penn. 1930). In that case a 
firm of stock brokers received a draft in payment of 
the individual debt to them of the drawer. The draft was 
drawn by the treasurn of a bank on its funds in another 
bank payablP to a fictitious person, and was delivered 
by the treasurer to the brokers, with the endorsement 
of the name of the fictitious person, and without the 
personal endorse>11wnt of the drawer. In discussing the 
application of ~G of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act (our 
~22-1-6) in discnssing "·hether or not "bad faith" ·within 
the meaning of tht> act was shown by the stock brokers 
in accepting the clH'C'k tht- Court stated: 
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"vVhile notice of defect in title to paper, or bad 
faith, is not presumed, the fact may be estab-
lished bv circumstances. Where fraud in the in-
ception of a transaction appeared, the conclusion 
of notice to the holder may be justified, and the 
fact that the manner of negotiation is unusual, as 
here, and not the way ordinarily followed in the 
course of business, is some evidence of bad faith. 
In this case, the maker was the treasurer, whom 
the defendants were bound to know had no right 
to use the bank's draft to pay his own debts. It 
was produced from his possession to another un-
known "~ho ·was named as payee, who seemingly 
endorsed the paper, and defendants accepted it 
without the individual endorsement of Maurer 
(the treasurer). The jury might find from the 
use of the draft for a personal debt by the officer 
who executed it, and to whom it had been returned, 
evidence of improper conduct by the transferor." 
Id. at 888. 
The court held, therefore, that the circumstances showing 
a trans£ er not in the ordinary course of business were 
sufficient to show bad faith within the meaning of ~6 
of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act. 
The analog)' to the instant case can readily be seen. 
Gny E. Davis delivered to res11ondent bank certain checks 
made ont to either fictitious persons or persons not in-
tendt>d to receive the proceeds of the checks. The re-
spond bank did not reqnire that Gu>' E. Davis personally 
endorse the checks with his name. Such circumstances 
are> not in tlw ordinary course of business as practiced 
by banks in this area. Considering the multiplicity of 
transactions in which thirty-two checks were thus nego-
tiated by Guy E. Davis through respondent bank and the 
large amounts involved, all amounts being in excess of 
$2,000.00 and some being in amounts as high as $5,000.00, 
the ordinary course of business would certainly dictate 
that the bank demand of Davis that he personally endorse 
each check before its negotiation. The failure of the bank 
to require the personal endorsement of Guy Davis on all 
of the thirty-two checks thus negotiated must certainly 
be evidence showing ba<l faith on the part of the bank. 
Bad faith does not require actual knowledge of the use 
of the funds of the principal by the agent for purposes 
outside the scope of his agency. As can be seen in the 
New Amsterdam Casualty case cited above, bad faith 
requires only knowledge of an incriminating state of 
facts from which it reasonably might be infrrred that 
the agent is not acting honestly. 
It is submitted that the multiplicity of transactions 
and the amounts of the checks involved together with 
the fact that the bank did not require proper endorse-
ments as is required in the ordinary course of business, 
amounts to a knowledge by the bank or its agent of just 
such an incriminating state of facts and that such state 
of facts should certainly show bad faith on the part of 
the bank. It is therdore submitted that the Lower Court 
erred in granting respondent's Motion for Dismissal. 
There are facts snffieient to point toward a showing of 
bad faith on the part of respondent bank even though 
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it should be found that provisions of the Uniform Fi-
duciaries Act apply to the facts in the instant pro-
ceedings. 
POINT V 
THE L 0 W E R COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING 
THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION OF PLAINTIFF'S 
ORIGINAL AND AMENDED COMPLAINTS FOR THE REA-
SON THAT TITLE 22, CHAPTER I, UTAH CODE ANNO-
TATED, (1953) EXPRESSLY PROVIDES THAT THE NAMED 
PAYEE OF A CHECK IS LIABLE TO THE PRINCIPAL IF 
SUCH PAYEE HAS ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE THAT THE 
PROCEEDS THEREFROM ARE FOR THE PERSONAL BEN-
EFIT OF THE FIDUCIARY, IF THE FIDUCIARY IN FACT 
COMMITS A BREACH OF HIS OBLIGATION IN DRAWING 
OR DELIVERING THE INSTRUMENT. 
Plaintiff's original and amended Complaints both 
allege that the proceeds from the three checks negoti-
ated with Zions First National Bank in which Zions 
First National Bank was a named payee were deposited 
to the account or accounts of Guy E. Davis in Zions 
First National Bank. Section 22-1-5, Utah Code Anno-
tated (1953) expressly provides that the payee of a check 
drawn by a fiduciary is not bound to inquire whether 
the fiduciary is committing a breach of his obligation 
as fiduciary in drawing or delivering the instrument. 
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However, a proviso of that section states: 
"If, however, such instrument is payable to a 
personal creditor of the fiduciary and delivered 
to the creditor in payment of, or as security for, 
a personal debt of the fiduciary to the actual 
knowledge of the creditor, or is drawn and deliv-
fred in any transaction known by the payee to 
1H? for the benefit of the fiditciary, the creditor or 
other payee is liable to the principal, if the fidu.-
ciary in fact commits a breach of his obligation 
as ficfociary in drawing or delivering the instru-
ment." (Emphasis added.) 
A proper application of this section would require that 
Zions First National Bank upon being presented with a 
check in which Zions First National Bank was a named 
payee be liable for misappropriated funds of such a 
fiduciary if, in fact, Zions First National Bank had actual 
knowledge that the proceeds of the check were to go for 
the benefit of the fiduciary. Since the original and 
Amended Complaints of the plaintiff allege that the 
proceeds from the three checks in which Zions First 
National Bank was a named payee went directly into 
the account or accounts of Guy E. Davis it must be 
deemed that the bank had actual knowledge that such 
proceeds were to go to the personal benefit of Guy E. 
Davis. In the absence of any allegations or facts to the 
contrary, the bank must be held to be liable for the pro-
ceeds wrongfully paid to Guy E. Davis and the Order 
of Dismissal of the Lower Conrt in both the original and 
Amended Complaints was thus improper. 
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CONCLUSION 
The test of the correctness and validity of an Order 
of Dismissal for failure to state a claim is whether in 
the light most favorable to plaintiff, and with every 
intendment regarded in his favor, the complaint is suf-
ficient to constitute a valid claim. Barron & H olt.zoff, 
FPderal Practice & ProCPdure §356 (Rules Edition 1960). 
It is appellant's contention that an Order of Dis-
missal was improper in plaintiff's original Complaint 
for two reasons: First, the record is replete with alle-
gations and facts, which if taken in the light most favor-
able to plaintiff, does make out a valid claim. Second, 
the Lower Court incorrectly construed the purpose and 
intent of the Utah Fiduciaries Act, which act has no 
application to the facts and allegations of the instant 
case. 
Furthermore, the Motion to Dismiss plaintiff's 
Amended Complaint was improperly granted because 
the record shows sufficient facts and allegations to make 
a valid Complaint, if such facts are taken in the light 
most favorable to plaintiff. 
Therefore, appellant respectfully submits that the 
decision of the Lower Court should be reversed and 
the matter remanded for further proceedings in ac-
cordance with law. 
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Respectfully suhmitted, 
Bruce K Coke 
William J. And<>rson 
BEASLIN,NYGAARD, COKE 
& YTNCENT 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, 
Sugarhouse Finawe Company 
